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Abstract
 Triangle Shirtwaist Company of New York has been best remembered for its fire 
of 1911 because as many as 146 people, mostly newly-arrived female immigrants, died 
in a space of eighteen minutes and also because it later forced the fundamental reforms 
in politics and industry. Sen. Elizabeth Warren, a leading presidential candidate of the 
Democratic Party, chose the site in September 2019 to hold her largest rally to date as 
a reminder that it was working people who paid the price when the corrupt politicians 
ignored the safety of workers.  
 What makes the Triangle fire especially tragic is that many of the victims had 
already called attention to the dangerous working place as well as the corruption between 
politics and industry during the general strike of garment workers of 1909, “Uprising of 
the Twenty-thousand,” which started at the Triangle. It was the largest strike by women, 
mostly Russian Jewish women, and lasted for more than ten weeks. The strike influenced 
both the garment workers outside of New York and workers of other trades. The fire in part 
resulted from the defeat of the Triangle strikers, as aptly described, “The strike that started 
at Triangle was not won at Triangle.” If the Triangle employers had accepted some of their 
demands, the tragedy might have been avoided. 
 At the 110th anniversary of the strike, it might be worthwhile to pay tribute in Japan, 
where the story is less well-known, to those garment workers who strove to make structural 
changes in society where people were divided between newly-arrived immigrants and the 
native-born, between the haves and the have-nots, just as we see today. One of the lessons 
New Yorkers learned from the strike of immigrants was that the improvement of their 
condition must be the improvement for all in the city.
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1. Ｉｎｔｒｏｄｕｃｔｉｏｎ 
 Sen. Elizabeth Warren, a leading presidential candidate of the 
Democratic Party, had a good reason for choosing to hold her largest rally to 
date in New York City’s Washington Square Park in September 2019. She 
urged the crowd to join her in making structural changes in American democ-
racy, just as the victims of the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire of 1911 forced 
the federal and state governments to improve working conditions. Explaining 
that it was the working people who paid the price when corrupt politicians ig-
nored the safety of workers at the Triangle Shirtwaist Company, Sen. Warren 
asked if this sounded familiar to us now. She continued that Americans con-
front such problems as climate change, guns, and health care because “giant 
corporations bought off our government.” 1
 She was right that the fire, which killed 129 women and 17 men in a 
space of eighteen minutes, had a profound impact on building codes, labor 
laws, and politics, including the New Deal, by changing the mindset of many 
politicians and employers. One of the witnesses of the fire, Frances Perkins, 
became the investigator for the Factory Investigating Committee of the fire 
and was later appointed as the first female cabinet member as secretary of 
labor under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and fought for workplace 
safety.2 Perkins collaborated with Sen. Robert Wagner to pass the National 
Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standard Act because of the fire.
 The fire was a tragedy itself, but what makes the Triangle fire especially 
tragic is that many of the victims had already called attention to the danger-
ous working places during a general strike of garment workers in 1909, “The 
Uprising of the Twenty-thousand.” The Triangle fire resulted in part from the 
defeat of the Triangle strikers: in addition to their failure to gain demands, 
such as the union recognition, fire escapes, and half-day holiday on Saturdays, 
their collective action prompted the Triangle owners, Isaac Harris and Max 
Blanck, to strengthen their control over the workers, in ways such as locking 
them in while they were at work. When the fire broke out, those workers of 
other companies who had won the strike were enjoying their half-day holiday. 
As the editor of The Justice, a periodical of the International Ladies’ Garment 
Workers’ Union, aptly said, “The strike that started at Triangle was not won at 
Triangle.” 3 If the Triangle employers had accepted the demands of their own 
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workers, the tragedy might have been avoided. 
 Both the strike of 1909 and the fire of 1911 at Triangle Shirtwaist 
Company are representative of the Progressive era. While America’s laissez-
faire policy of the nineteenth century greatly contributed to making the 
United States rich and powerful, the rapid industrialization and urbanization 
at the turn of the twentieth century created intolerable problems, such as pov-
erty, disease, unhealthy working conditions, overcrowding houses, and rampant 
political corruption. It is the era when Jacob A. Riis shocked the world with 
his photos, How the Other Half Lives: Studies Among the Tenements of New York, 
while muckrakers were committed to exposing scandals and corruptions of 
politicians and large corporations. In fact, the land of equal opportunities be-
came far from the reality in which only one percent of American corporations 
came to control more than thirty-three percent of the manufacturing by the 
end of the nineteenth century, and more than 4,000 companies disappeared 
through corporate merger between 1897 and 1924. At the turn of the twenti-
eth century, many Americans were convinced of the pressing need to impose 
order on the growing chaos and to curb industrial society’s most glaring injus-
tices. Instead of laissez-faire, the government should do something to human-
ize capitalism.4
 Because the Triangle fire eventually led to the structural changes, it 
is customary to discuss the legacy of the fire as Progressivism, whereas the 
strike has occupied a separate place in women’s labor history.5 It is, however, 
more appropriate to understand the two incidents as one, given the fact that 
the strike not only failed to give the Triangle workers protections but also 
strengthened the employers’ control of their workers, both wrecked further 
havoc on the fire. While professional reformers, politicians, and muckrakers 
have been understood as the leading contributors to the Progressive move-
ment, those ordinary working women of the garment industry in New York 
were the pioneering Progressives because the strikers had initiated the work to 
bring about changes. At the 110th anniversary of the strike, this article revisits 
the strike, drawing mostly from the primary sources, in order to pay tribute to 
those garment workers who strove to make structural changes in society where 
people were divided between newly-arrived immigrants and the native-born, 
between white people and people of color, as well as between the haves and 
the have-nots, just as we see today. There might be still a lesson for us to learn. 
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2. The Cause of the Strike
 New York City at the turn of the twentieth century was a magnet for 
dissatisfied people from abroad, especially from eastern and southern Europe. 
Although rapid industrialization in the city created jobs for vast numbers of 
newly-arrived immigrants, many of the fine assets and skills they brought with 
them, such as the ability to make an entire dress or embroidery, were not very 
useful in the piece-work system in factories, which relied on speed and high 
volume of output.6
 While Wall Street and Fifth Avenue epitomized the prosperity of New 
York City, the clothing industry ranked first in 1909 both in employment and 
production. A number of factors, such as the growing demand of ready-made 
clothing, the access of New York to cheap immigrant labor, raw materials from 
the South and Europe, and the latest fashion news from Europe, made the 
garment trade into a leading industry in the nation for a short period. Within 
the clothing industry, an increase in the number of female office workers made 
the shirtwaist trade very successful. The shirtwaist, a women’s blouse, a com-
bination of mannish collar and feminine line, represented women’s freedom 
and independence, for women went to work wearing the shirtwaist. By 1900, 
twenty percent of all manufacturing workers were women, and the textile 
industry was the largest single industrial employers of women, other than do-
mestic service, which still remained the most common female occupation.7 
 Many German Jews and Russian Jews had experience in the sewing 
trades in their old countries and aspired to become “the shirtwaist kings.” 8 
Unlike more prestigious occupations, which were open only to those who were 
familiar with the language and culture of America, the shirtwaist industry was 
dominated by newly-arrived immigrants. Eighty percent of the workers in 
the trade were young women, fifty-five percent of whom were Russian Jews, 
thirty-five percent were Italian, and seven percent were American.9
 To make the best profit, a manufacturer employed subcontractors. 
Subcontractors, mostly men, exploited “girl helpers,” the least skilled work-
ers. While the first generation of factory working women had some personal 
contact with shop owners, the subcontracting system severed the tie between 
them. Once this system was introduced, manufacturers no longer bothered 
themselves with individual wages paid to helpers. They merely entered the 
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total amount paid to subcontractors in their ledgers, taking no responsibil-
ity for workers’ wages.10 As one of the employers confessed, “The girls never 
knew...For a long time they still got the same low pay. Triangle and the inside 
contractor got the difference.” 11
 From the beginning of the twentieth century, New Yorkers saw a great 
deal of unrest among clothing workers. Interestingly enough, it was a sub-
contractor, Jake Klein, who initiated the strike against the Triangle Shirtwaist 
Company in 1908. Tired by “slave-driving,” Klein struck for three days along 
with four hundred workers. The outburst was settled when the company 
promised to establish the Triangle Employees Benevolent Association. It be-
came apparent, however, that this association was under the complete control 
of the company. Workers thus started thinking of leaving the association and 
joining Local 25.12
 On 28 September 1909, two hundred workers of the Triangle walked 
out again when they were discharged for joining Local 25. On November 
22, Cooper Union on Manhattan’s Lower East Side was packed with more 
than 20,000 people ready to discuss a general strike. It was Clara Lemlich, a 
20-year-old Russian immigrant, whose enthusiastic address spoken in Yiddish 
united the workers in support of a general strike. The next morning the gar-
ment district was in chaos: the strike began on 23 November 1909. Clinton 
Hall, a strike headquarters, was jammed with strikers who wanted to join the 
union as well as small manufacturers who hurried to settle. 
 New Yorkers were at first puzzled by this outburst. One reader wrote to 
the New York Times that “the better condition cry” was “too generic and we 
make further inquiry.” 13 In spite of considerable public attention, very few New 
Yorkers knew what the strikers were fighting for. Even worse, as one paper 
reported, “very few strikers could tell clearly why they left their work places.” 
Manufacturers repeated that it was “a foolish hysterical strike” and that “not a 5 
percent of the strikers know what they are striking for.” Several manufacturers 
said that they had paid more than strikers were now asking for.14
 It is true that both the average and expert shirtwaist workers, who 
formed sixty percent and twenty percent of the trade respectively, earned on 
average nine dollars and eighteen dollars a week, which was not considered so 
low.15 In this period, two-thirds of women gainfully employed earned less than 
six dollars a week, whereas those who worked in such factories as candy, box, 
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and artificial flowers made only three dollars and fifty cents a week.16 Indeed, 
according to a letter in The World, a number of working women in the shirt-
waist trade earned “a great deal more than men with families.” 17
 However, those who thought of the strike as meaningless might have 
been shocked by the lives of ill-paid workers. New Yorkers came to learn many 
stories of individual workers. For instance, two strikers attempted suicide in 
December 1909 because the five dollars a week one of the girls sometimes made 
after two years’ experience became insufficient to sustain her life. Although 
she attended a night school to improve her condition, she lost the meaning 
of life.18 They also learned that most of the striking women were single but 
“married to family”̶workers who lived with their families gave unopened pay 
envelopes to their mothers. Others often saved money to bring their families 
to America.19 
 Many ill-paid workers struggled to make both ends meet but dared not 
to initiate the strike. They were terrorized by fear, according to the president 
of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union （ILGWU）.20 Unable 
to see that a concerted action might better their lives, some ill-paid workers 
desperately tried to reduce expenses and remain obedient to their bosses. The 
only resistance they attempted was stealing materials from factories, another 
reason why the Triangle Company had locked workers in when the 1911 fire 
broke out.21
 If many shirtwaist workers were paid better than their sisters in other 
trades and ill-paid shirtwaist workers were too weak to revolt, who started 
the strike and for what purpose? Clara Lemlich offered her own answer. She 
confessed that although she had been reported to earn only three to six dollars 
a week in a bad shop, she actually made fifteen dollars a week in a good shop. 
“I did not strike because I myself was not getting enough. I struck because all 
others should get enough.” 22
 Although the weekly wages of well-paid workers were not bad in a busy 
season, a long slack season heavily affected the lives of all shirtwaist workers.23 
In fact, Lemlich’s good wages lasted only for two months. One of the common 
efforts to save money among workers was that they walked between home and 
factory, which sometimes took three quarters of hour after exhausting workday. 
Their wages had not been raised since the depression of 1908, in spite of a grow-
ing garment industry.24 What was worse, the soaring prices of the necessities 
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of life in 1909 made workers’ attempt at saving less effective. Working condi-
tions differed considerably among shops as well; while those of large factories 
were satisfactory, many of small shops had some features of the sweating system. 
The strike also revealed that some large manufacturers presented wages paid to 
a group of workers as a salary for one person. As a result, as Clarence Burns of 
Little Mothers’ Aid Association said, working women began to “see the folly of 
meekly accepting a wage.” 25
 If the low wage was unbearable only for a minority of workers, the ca-
price of bosses affected all; abusive language, yelling, violation of wage scale, 
and unequal distribution of work by favoritism were common. “Bosses call 
them down even worse than I imagine the Negro slaves were in the South,” 
said Lemlich.26 What was at stake for many workers was human dignity stolen 
by the tyrannical bosses. Employers treated their workers like less than human 
beings. According to socialist Theresa Malkiel, this strike was “an eruption of 
a long smoldering volcano, an overflow of suffering, abuse, and exhaustion.” 27
 Contrary to the manufacturers’ argument that none of their workers 
complained before, workers had been far from content with their condi-
tions. They did not complain because they could not afford unemployment. 
Manufacturers made every attempt to exploit young immigrant women: they 
charged for electricity, needles, thread, and other appliances; they covered a 
clock with cloth so that workers kept working without knowing of their over-
time; if a worker happened to make a lot of money by piece-work, she was 
forced to work by a less-paid weekly rate. Bosses made tickets by which cash 
was paid, so tiny that workers often lost them and could not get full wages; if 
a worker came late by five minutes, she was ordered to go home. Workers had 
no control over their work or lives.28
 In addition to the resentment against working conditions, idealism kept 
workers’ fight alive. The Lower East Side was the center of radical ideas, and 
the notion that collective power could secure justice for a powerless individual 
was diffused among skilled workers in particular. Workers of New York were 
militant with a firm belief in the power of organization, rather than legislation, 
as a means of protection. To those who deeply observed industrial experience, 
the reality was far from their learned ideas. As one of the working women said, 
immigrant workers did not expect to encounter czars in America. Those czars 
were not Americans but Jewish people, the same as most of their employees.29 
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At the same time, the patience of poor workers was equally frustrating to the 
strike leaders. The “greatest wonder was that the workers endured this con-
stant dragging down of their self-respect,” said Lemlich.30 Strike leaders were 
eager to awaken those employers who fattened themselves at the price of the 
workers’ dignity and self-respect.
 The crux of the matter for the strikers was, however, the union. Because 
these unorganized young immigrant workers were just “hands” to manufactur-
ers and also because unskilled workers were easily replaced at the caprice of 
bosses, mistreatment against workers would continue. For shirtwaist workers, 
whose trade was not standardized, the union was the only protection. After 
“many years of blindness,” the Call said this uprising, together with the educa-
tion provided by labor leaders, awoke workers. The Call gladly announced that 
these new converts finally opened their eyes to the importance of organiza-
tion and that strikers were eager to listen to the “voice of the new gospel” of 
unionism.31
 For the manufacturers who had long enjoyed large profits by exploiting 
unorganized workers, however, the union was a “disastrous interference” with 
their business.32 For them, what was at stake was who should control factories. 
Their strong fear of losing supremacy was apparent when manufacturers, for 
the first time in this trade, formed an employers’ association just five days after 
the declaration of the general strike. According to The World, members of this 
association threatened those manufacturers who accepted the union.33 Unless 
manufacturers secured solidarity among themselves, only union shops might 
attract consumers. While protecting themselves from workers and competitors 
of their own class, large manufacturers denied workers the same right for self-
defense. Even though they regarded themselves as “kings,” manufacturers were 
aware of the collective power of workers. They discharged union members and 
repeatedly told workers that the union was “un-American.” Since most of the 
shirtwaist workers were newly arrived immigrant women who were uncom-
fortable if they looked un-American, it was a psychologically effective tactic to 
prevent union activity.
 Public response to the union issue was divided. Because manufacturers 
skillfully used the term “close shop,” insisting that it was unpatriotic, a number 
of people resented it. While strikers meant “protection” by union, manufac-
turers gave the public the impression that it was an attempt to exclude some 
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workers. As a result, some defined it as “modified form of murder.” 34 It was 
also true that strikers were so convinced of the organized power that they 
refused any settlement short of union recognition. This uncompromising at-
titude surpassed the limit of good tactics to gain public support. It unneces-
sarily prolonged the strike and lost many sympathizers. For the public, strikers 
gradually seemed to be “irresponsible and reckless.” 35 Growing indifference of 
supporters and the depletion of money ended the strike.
3. The Significance of the Strike
 The Shirtwaist Strike or The Uprising of the Twenty-thousand of 1909 
was not only unparalleled in its magnitude but also unique in its diversity of 
people involved. On the call of a general strike for better working conditions, 
as many as 20,000 workers laid down their scissors together on 23 November 
1909. They were unorganized workers of 400 firms from Manhattan to 
Brownsville, and the strike continued until its end on 5 February 1910.36 More 
than 21,000 were Russian Jewish women, 2,000 Italian women, 1,000 native-
born white women, and 6,000 Russian men.37 The Women’s Trade Union 
League of New York, suffragettes of wealth, and socialists also joined the strike. 
Even for normally indifferent New Yorkers, this sight was too impressive to ig-
nore. “Such a spectacle, covering such a wide area, involving so many interests, 
social and personal, moral and material, embracing so much of moment to the 
community, is without parallel,” observed socialist William Mailly. 38
 The Uprising of the Twenty-thousand has been known as a women’s 
great achievement; women demonstrated their potential to work together 
beyond differences of class and nationality. The （New York） Evening Journal 
was tempted to predict that “---perhaps in the future the great chasm between 
capital and labor will be bridged by woman’s hands and women’s sympathy 
and understanding.” 39
 However, evidence tells us a different story. It is true that eighty percent 
of the strikers were women and their sympathizers were also women, but men 
played a key role in directing the strike and negotiating with the manufacturers.40 
Labor leaders emphasized that working women proved themselves to be unselfish 
and enduring fighters, but that was nothing new; from the colonial period, wom-
en’s fighting spirit had been well exhibited through boycotts and mass protests.41
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 While it is unprecedented that some twenty-thousand women of differ-
ent classes protested shoulder to shoulder, it does not suggest genuine sister-
hood. In the first place, the strikers and their sympathizers completely failed 
to embrace Afro-American women. Nor were they united for a single cause 
to win the strike. While all of their allies hoped for a successful strike, each 
ally had a different motivation to help working women. In other words, the 
real motives of the strikers’ allies lay not so much in the labor cause as in their 
own goals, such as socialism and suffrage. The strike crystallized the division 
among women more than it united them. 
 As a labor movement, the strike was of mixed results. The strike in-
creased the membership of Local 25 of the Ladies’ Waist Makers’ Union from 
merely a hundred to 20,000 as well as its income from $４ a week to $2,400. 
Those workers who succeeded in gaining union terms, amounting to 300 
firms out of 400, received higher wages by twenty percent on average, a work-
ing week shortened to 52 hours, the abolition of charges for sewing materials, 
and legal holidays. However, those who signed the union contract were small 
shops, playing a relatively minor role in the trade. In fact, “the strike that had 
started at Triangle was not won at Triangle,” as in the words of Leon Stein, 
a writer for the ILGWU publication. The strikers of Triangle had to return 
without the recognition of the union.42 Most of the employers, not workers, 
of such large firms as the Triangle, organized the Associated Waist and Dress 
Manufacturers and withheld the union recognition, for which the strikers 
were fighting. In short, the strike began over the issues of the union and ended 
with the same problem unsolved in dominant shops. Many working women 
deserted Local 25 soon after the end of the strike for fear of being discharged 
by bosses.43 
 Nevertheless, “The Uprising of the Twenty-thousand” is important be-
cause it played a role in educating New Yorkers by means of newspapers, pick-
ets, and mass meetings. Through this strike, corruption of employers, police, 
and magistrate came to the fore, making people realize the need for structural 
changes. It is remarkable that such a regional labor dispute, caused by the 
“foreign element,” developed social consciousness of New Yorkers. Not only 
did the shirtwaist strike awaken New Yorkers to social ills but it also changed 
the personal awareness of the strikers themselves. Most of them were in their 
teens and still new to the country. Their language problems suggest that they 
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hardly identified themselves as Americans. This strike exposed those foreign-
born young women to American society and helped them see themselves as a 
part of the working-class in America.
4. Strikers and Strikebreakers
1） Family, Language, and Religion of the Strikers
 Because most of the strikers were under the supervision of their parents, 
the relationship between strikers and their families affected the strike. One 
of the well-paid workers, who had learned from her mother that the stronger 
ought to help the weaker, joined the strike because, as she said, “Even if I 
wanted to go on working, my mamma says she’d be ashamed to have me.” 
Another mother of the strikers participated in the fight not by joining the 
strike but by embarrassing the garment shop that “dared” to sell the products 
of non-union manufacturers. She told the owner of the shop that she wanted 
to buy a set of wedding attire not only for her own daughter but also for the 
daughter’s cousin. Very delighted, the owner pulled “down all his stock” to 
show her, then she exclaimed: “why ain’t you got a union label? I won’t buy 
from a place that doesn’t settle with the girls.” 44
 Not all families supported the strike, however. A strike requires courage 
and sacrifice from all workers, but it was especially hard for those who had 
confrontations with their families. Because daughters’ wages were essential to 
family budgets and also because manufacturers paid a lot more to strikebreak-
ers, some parents did not allow their daughters to go to strike. A sixteen-year-
old girl, showing her body “covered with bruises literally from head to foot,” 
said that her father and brother beat her when she refused to go to work. She 
was so determined not to work that she wanted to apply for asylum.45 It is 
impressive that this sixteen-year-old girl felt responsible enough to fight with 
others. When they chose to strike even against the wishes of their families, 
it might be the beginning of working-class solidarity among these shirtwaist 
workers. Rose Schneiderman, a union leader, observed that prior to the strike, 
many working women not only did not know the names of co-workers but 
also looked upon others as enemies, “because one might get a better bundle of 
work than the other.” Once the general strike was declared, however, the idea 
that “an injury to one is the concern of all” penetrated deeply.46
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 By contrast, some parents were self-centered. A mother of two shirt-
waist workers said that it was nothing to her “what other girls get” as long 
as her daughters brought home “as much as $30 in one week.” 47 As the New 
York Times reported, “the father and the mother are not used to this new inde-
pendence.” Finding it necessary to educate a whole family in order to win the 
strike, members of the Women’s Trade Union League （WTUL） of New York 
and strikers visited homes of strikebreakers to teach trade unionism. Especially 
in the case of Italian women, who came from an agricultural background and a 
tradition of subordination to men, the WTUL tried to make men understand 
“the place the Italian women hold in modern industrial life.” 48
 “A serious problem was the strike-breakers’ inability to understand 
our message of trade unionism. I mean literally to understand,” lamented 
Schneiderman. A mass meeting required at least four interpreters, speaking 
German, Italian, Polish, and Yiddish. At the same time, the language problem 
helped employers to discourage working-class solidarity. Manufacturers placed 
an Italian woman beside a Jewish woman in the factory so that they could not 
communicate. They also tried to incite antagonism, telling Italians that the 
strike was an exclusively Jewish activity.49
 In addition to the language barrier, it was not easy for strikers to reach 
strikebreakers physically. Strikebreakers were escorted by “strong-arm men,” 
one of whom was “only three weeks out of prison.” 50 To avoid confrontation, 
some companies sent for a taxi so that strikebreakers would not face strik-
ers. Even usually orderly strikers sometimes lost their patience. They yelled at 
strikebreakers and their escorts, threw “aged but strong eggs” against them. 
Some strikebreakers were so frightened that they would not go out without 
escorts. When a fire broke out at the factory of Max Roth on December 15, 
workers “preferred risking death to being jeered at by the strikers” outside, re-
ported the New York Times.51
Strikebreakers disrupted concerted action by both taking the place of strikers 
and joining the union for a few days in order to learn the plans and strength 
of the union and then going back to tell their bosses. Manufacturers offered a 
double pay, short working hours, long lunch times with “free lunch and waltz 
music on the gramophone.” 52 The willingness of strikebreakers to take these 
jobs suggests not only their little trust of and insight into trade unionism but 
also how badly workers needed money. Strikers understood that they ought 
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to improve the conditions of all workers so that nobody would break a strike. 
A number of strikebreakers were strangers to strikers, but some were their co-
workers. Observing her co-worker entering the factory, one of the strikers said, 
“We don’t make remarks after her. She gets only $４ a week and she’d be strik-
ing too, if she had a winter coat.” 53 
 The Call, presumably hoping to urge Italian labor leaders to take some 
action, emphasized that the strikebreakers were all Italians and that there was 
danger of “race warfare” between Jewish strikers and Italian strikebreakers. 
In response, Italian male socialists and trade unionists got right to work; they 
established a special headquarters, held meetings, and urged Italian newspa-
pers to stop advertising for strikebreakers. Their efforts bore fruit. Over 3,000 
Italian women joined the picket line, and “for the first time in the history 
of the Italian labor movement in New York City,” Italian labor leaders were 
asked to make a speech at the Hippodrome meeting.54
 The church also influenced the attitude of shirtwaist workers toward the 
strike. An Italian woman explained why many strikebreakers were her folks. 
She said that one day a priest came to her factory to tell workers if they struck, 
they would go to hell.55 On the other hand, some churches felt responsibility 
for the settlement of the strike, viewing it as a community’s problem. One of 
them was Church of the Holy Trinity in Brooklyn. Its rector John H. Melish 
made a special effort for publicity and early settlement. Presiding as chairman 
of the Hippodrome meeting, he protested against “the use of the police power 
by any one class in the community against another.” 56 “Tired of the strike” and 
hoping to end it before a new year, the Manhattan Congregational Church 
went to the headquarters of the manufacturers, but in vain.57
2） Immigrant Strikers and Afro-American Strikebreakers
 The most serious flaw in this strike was the attitude of strikers’ to-
ward Afro-American working women. While fighting for justice and social 
betterment, strikers and their wealthy philanthropists totally ignored Afro-
American people. Complete working-class solidarity, which socialists, trade 
unionists, and working women sought in this strike, could not be realized as 
long as Afro-American women remained excluded from the industry. While 
writing about the strike in precise detail, almost none of the major papers 
dedicated space to Afro-American working women. Afro-American women, 
84
Junko Isono KATO： e Progressive Shirtwaist Working Women of New York in the Fight 
for Structural Changes in Society
ninety percent of whom had worked as domestic servants, saw in this strike an 
opening to work in garment factories as strikebreakers. In early 1910, however, 
a mass meeting of Afro-American people in Brooklyn resolved “to refrain 
from injuring other working women” on the ground that they also belonged to 
the same working-class and that those “white girls who are fighting for better 
conditions in their trade are her [Afro-American woman’s] allies, not her en-
emies.” 58
 How many of them had actually worked as strikebreakers and how 
many refrained after the meeting are unclear. But it is clear that after the 
meeting, the Age, an Afro-American newspaper, refused to stop advertising 
shirtwaist maker’s positions when they were asked to do so by strike leaders. “In 
sense and justice,” the Age said, there was no reason Afro-American women 
ought to refuse this opportunity. They had not been invited to the union be-
fore the strike. Furthermore, the Age argued that strike leaders had not prom-
ised to keep Afro-American women when the strike was settled. For the Age, 
this strike highlighted the fact that labor leaders considered Afro-American 
people only “in days of adversity” not in “those of prosperity.” 59
 Even at the end of January 1910, according to the Survey, neither 
the union nor union shops admitted Afro-American women. In response, 
Margaret Dreier Robins, president of the National WTUL, proudly said 
that the union in New York had one Afro-American member and that of 
Philadelphia had two. One of them was secretary of her shop committee, 
“elected by white girls.” She emphasized how this secretary was welcome: “---a 
young Russian Jewess ran up to her,” when the Afro-American woman came 
to the WTUL, “holding out both hands, said, ‘I am so glad you have joined 
us.” But this was an exception.60
3） Native-born Americans and Immigrant Strikers
 If Afro-American women were excluded from the strike, many native-
born white working women ignored the strike. Jewish working women in 
particular considered white Americans “as helpless for purposes of concerted 
action as the Italians.” 61 About 1,000 native-born white working women did 
strike, but for only one week or two out of thirteen-week strike movement.
 Several factors account for their indifference. First, native-born white 
working women shared almost nothing with foreign-born working women. 
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Most of them worked in uptown shops, which had far better conditions than 
those downtown where immigrants worked. Furthermore, the skills of the 
Americans secured satisfactory wages and constant employment. They tended 
to work at the same shop for years. Consequently, unlike foreign workers, 
Americans had a certain amount of loyalty to their employers, which prevent-
ed protests. American women knew that some of the downtown shops were 
unsanitary but blamed immigrants. They thought that if only immigrants be-
came skilled, they would be assured good jobs.62 
 American women, therefore, not only felt no need for a trade union but 
resented the idea as well. Employers repeatedly told Americans that the union 
was promoted by foreigners and unladylike. Jewish labor leaders regretted this 
prevailing notion because the truth was that the first women’s labor move-
ment in America was organize by the native-born textile workers. Rather than 
unpatriotic, this fight for justice was very American.63
 The most tenacious obstacle to native-born white working women’s 
joining the strike was prejudice against foreigners. Because of their skill, 
native-born white workers regarded themselves as superior to immigrant 
workers. One of the Americans complained that work done by immigrants 
was poor. Moreover, the cheap workforce of immigrants sometimes affected 
Americans. They criticized immigrants for not knowing how to bargain in 
America. Life and Labor, an educational magazine of the WTUL, warned 
immigrant workers through a story. In one shop, all the American working 
women left because a Russian woman agreed to work for five dollars a week 
whereas American sisters had worked for nine dollars a week.64 The Factory 
Investigating Commission found cases in which immigrant women were seg-
regated in the work room as well as in other facilities. It was, according to their 
report, sometimes necessary “to keep them in one room.” It was also common 
for Americans to ridicule the clothes immigrant women were wearing, which 
was discouraging to these young newly-arrived women.65
 The striking American women were at a great disadvantage because 
they formed only seven percent of the total work force, making it appear that 
the strike did not “appeal at all to the American girls.” 66 On the contrary, the 
fact was that 1,000 strikers represented twenty to thirty percent of all native-
born white women in this trade, while less than ten percent of Italians became 
strikers when the general strike was declared. Considering that Americans had 
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no shared history with immigrants in Local 25 and no immediate demands, it 
is fair to say that Americans were rather cooperative.
 Americans who joined the strike regarded themselves more as philan-
thropists than as workers. Knowing the plight of foreign sisters, Americans 
sympathized with them but did not have the enthusiasm of Jewish strikers. 
What Jewish workers articulated seemed to Americans to be vague and vi-
sionary. Americans needed more definite purposes; immediate returns in the 
immediate future.
 Realizing that it was necessary to make a different appeal to Americans, 
the WTUL established a special strike headquarters and visited Americans in 
their houses to teach unionism. Ironically, after the strike it became apparent 
that native-born white working women were ardent unionists, but not good 
fighters. By contrast, Schneiderman found during the strike that Jewish wom-
en were aggressive fighters but not loyal unionists: “---to make them stick to 
an organization after a strike, is the hardest job anybody can be up against.” “It 
is hard to get the American girls into the organization,” she continued, “but 
when you once get them, you have them, they are with you.” The shirtwaist 
strike also revealed that unless bigger shops, where Americans worked, were 
organized, unionism could not be achieved.67
4） What Strikers Learned
 The strike exposed working women to a larger world than their own 
shops and homes. Because the strike was discussed everywhere in New York, 
strikers had to learn the principles of the trade unionism, socialism, and suf-
frage as well as the art of a good argument and speech. Because public support 
was crucial, strikers had to both convince New Yorkers of the importance of 
this struggle and to argue with bosses on the streets sometimes. It was not 
easy, for they had no such experience before and also many of them still had 
a language problem. In spite of physical danger and humiliation, they showed 
an ability to undertake many tasks, such as picketing, holding mass meetings, 
acting as sandwich-girls and “newsies.” 
 According to The Call, “the most remarkable feature of this strike is 
the absence of leaders. All the girls seem to be imbued with a spirit of activ-
ity.”68 Needless to say, working in factories requires responsibility, but to ex-
press opinions in public requires another kind of responsibility. One of the 
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strikers explained to Mayor George B. Mclellan in person how the police 
treated her. Under the caption of “GIRL STRIKERS TALK OVER OWN 
SIGNATURE,” twenty strikers gave The World their comments with sig-
nature. In writing the daily progress of the strike, the press, especially The 
World and The Call, specified the name, age, and working place of both a 
striker and a strikebreaker. It can be said that presenting themselves before a 
variety of people reinforced these women’s sense of responsibility as members 
of American society, as well as their class consciousness as representatives of 
working people.69
 Collective power is another lesson. Though strikes were common oc-
currences, it was meaningful for those 20,000 who had never participate in 
a concerted action before to experience its greatness. While the strike did 
not change the balance of power between capital and labor, shirtwaist work-
ers demonstrated that even unorganized working women were able to limit 
the tyrannical power of bosses. Even Lemlich, called “the Joan of Arc,” was 
surprised: “We never really expected that the mass of the workers would be 
inspired and come out. I seem to see the realization of the words of Karl 
Marx.” 70 Manufacturers also learned of the ready help of well-to-do women 
for their working sisters.71
5. Municipality
 In addition to manufacturers and strikebreakers, the shirtwaist strikers 
unexpectedly confronted another enemy: police and magistrates. Police brutal-
ity and magistrates’ discrimination against strikers had begun when 200 work-
ers walked out at the Triangle. The police, completely disregarding the law 
allowing workers to strike, hit, beat, clubbed, and sometimes stabbed strikers. 
One of the officers frankly said that they were hired by the manufacturers to 
“protect scabs.” 72 To discourage the strikers as well as to empty the treasury of 
the union for the use of bail and bonds, the police arrested the strikers in large 
numbers. When the WTUL began to play a central role at the third week of 
the Triangle strike, they found the police discriminating against the “young 
foreign speaking girls,” while taking care not to arrest WTUL women, who 
were English-speaking wealthy women. The73 WTUL’s letter of protest to the 
Police Commissioner Baker was completely ignored.74
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 Ironically, it was the police who effectively publicized the Triangle strike. 
The arrest of Mary Dreier, the well-to-do president of the WTUL, occupied 
the first page of every major newspaper on November 5. Drier, “a frail young 
woman,” was struck by a strikebreaker and was arrested.75 For the police, 
who tried to distinguish working women from wealthy sympathizes, it was a 
“blunder.” 76 The arresting officer apologized: “Why didn’t you tell me who 
you were. I wouldn’t have touched you.” 77 It was only then that people realized 
that it took as many as 40,000 workers in New York to supply shirtwaists and 
that one of the largest factories, the Triangle, was on strike. Before this inci-
dent, the idea of a general strike had been unthinkable to Local 25. The press, 
however, furnished the union with a chance. It both increased the sympathiz-
ers and stimulated class-consciousness among shirtwaist workers.78
 At first, some New Yorkers were suspicious of news coverage about 
police brutality. In response to Dreier’s observation that “employers had ‘sug-
ared’ the police,” one woman decisively told the New York Times that “it is 
untrue.” 79 When a group of socially well-known people, such as Lillian Wald 
of the Henry Street Settlement, formed a committee to protect strikers from 
misconduct of the police, the editors of the New York Times expressed their 
wonder why “the excellent and very well-meaning ladies and gentlemen” took 
pains to criticize the police.80 Inspired by the fighting strikers, the committee 
realized that “the time is ripe” to bring justice to the corrupt police. In the face 
of undeniable facts, the supporters of the police were defenseless.
 Outraged by injustice, 10,000 people marched to City Hall on December 
3, bringing 30,000 signatures to protest to Mayor Maclellan. He was amazed at 
their stories but did nothing. When he was invited to the Hippodrome meeting 
on the subject of the strike, he declined, as newspaper reported, on the ground 
that “he was not interested in the welfare of 40,000 striking girls.” 81 How many 
New Yorkers other than strikers actually participated in these meetings and 
marches is unknown. But the press coverage was powerful enough to reach a 
large public. In fact, after the arrest of Dreier, a large crowd gathered in the gar-
ment district to see how policemen treated the strikers.82
 The mayor’s attitude was echoed in every part of the city government. 
Those who volunteered to attend the night court told the press that magis-
trates unhesitatingly charged strikers and discharged strikebreakers, regardless 
of evidence. The volunteers asked people to come and see how corrupt the 
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magistrates were. Most of the magistrates simply did not listen to strikers. One 
of numerous examples was the case of Anne Dump. Severely beaten up by a 
strikebreaker, she was forced to stay in bed for two days. Magistrate Barlow 
was “displeased” with her because she answered through an interpreter because 
of a language difficulty. Barlow held Dump instead of the strikebreakers.83
 The shirtwaist strike also revealed the negligence of factory inspectors. 
One reason for strikers’ insistence on union recognition was that they knew 
that the law was never violated in the eyes of factory inspectors. Foremen were 
vigilant in making sure workers would say “the right thing,” and inspectors 
were “regularly duped.” 84 When the Survey attempted to investigate shirtwaist 
factories, the State Labor Department refused to provide any information on 
factories against the promise the officials had made. The Department also 
advised that “manufacturers were in such an irritable frame of mind from the 
criticism that it would be impossible to enter any of the shops.” But to their 
surprise, the representatives of the Survey were “courteously received and 
promptly admitted into” shops, presumably because manufacturers wanted to 
secure public support and also because some of those shops were large enough 
to have good conditions.85
 Publicity against city authorities by the press brought strikers double-
edged effects. While it elicited emotional and financial support from the 
public, the emphasis on police activities rather than labor dispute obscured 
the strike itself. Nonetheless, the injustice of the police and magistrates helped 
strengthen solidarity among strikers and their allies. It even drew attention 
from those who had no interest in the labor cause itself. Instead of dismissing 
fighting immigrants as uncivilized rebels, people came to see that “they were 
working not merely for themselves but for society as a whole,” which muck-
raker Ida Tarbell called “a new solidarity of society.” 86 People felt it as their 
duty to help working women maintain good health, at least for the sake of 
the community, if not for the benefit of these women themselves. The strike 
brought to a heterogeneous mass of people the idea of common interest for 
social development as well as a strong sense of justice.87 As the Survey warned 
people, police brutality was not only the fault of the policemen but also that of 
the community who chose them.88
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6. Strike Sympathizers
 With zealous enthusiasm, some public-minded women of wealth sought 
to reform and civilize the man-made capitalist society, despite that they them-
selves benefited from it. This is a period in which many women would no 
longer comply with male supremacy. It was evident from the growing suffrage 
movement and the unprecedentedly high divorce rate. Wealthy women be-
came more self-conscious and tried to shape their own identities.89
 It was these women who added an educational dimension to the battle. 
Most of them were upper-class suffrage activists, such as O. H. P. Belmont of 
the Political Equality Association and Anna Shaw of the National American 
Woman Suffrage Association. Others were socialists, such a Theresa Malkiel 
and Rose Pastor Stokes.90 The strike, which cost $100,000 altogether, was 
largely financed by contributions from these people. More importantly, well-
known wealthy women, called the “Mink Brigade,” lent prestige and respect-
ability to the strike. New Yorkers recognized that, as Tarbell put it, “it is a 
movement which must be respected.” The list of those who expressed their 
support in the press, such as Helen Taft, a daughter of the President, Anna 
Morgan, a daughter of J. P. Morgan, and the English playwriter George 
Bernard Shaw, was effective enough to discourage strike critics.91
 Although the contribution of the well-to-do was invaluable, they caused 
more troubles than if they had not participated in the strike. First of all, they 
shifted the characters of the strike from a pure labor struggle to a political 
movement. At the outset of the general strike, the WTUL and Local 25 re-
peatedly declared that it should not be “confused with a political movement.”92 
However, because the “Mink Brigade” carried more weight with New Yorkers 
than labor organizations, the center of the strike gradually shifted to suffra-
gettes, especially O. H. P. Belmont. In fact, when a group of lawyers offered 
their services for the strikers, they approached Belmont, not the union head-
quarters.93 Because suffrage activists arranged mass meetings and parades for 
the sake of the strikers, it seemed to the public that the shirtwaist strike and “a 
feminist movement” were identical.94 As a result, the strike led to strange coa-
litions: strikers, unionists, and suffragists on the one hand, and strikebreakers, 
non-unionists, and ant-suffragists on the other. Suffragists held mass meetings 
to teach strikers that the industrial struggle and women’s suffrage movement 
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should go together. By contrast, Rosenthal Brothers & Co. one of the factories 
that still had workers at work, asked anti-suffragist Mrs. William Forse Scott 
to address non-union women on the subject of “personal liberty and respect 
for law and order.” 95
 The strike gave suffragists a golden opportunity to reach working 
women. Anna Shaw confessed at the Hippodrome that although she had been 
seeking to cooperate with working women for a long time, she had not known 
how to get together. Because this strike gave women a valuable experience-
--how to act together, she thought it would help the success of the suffrage 
movement.96 Some suffragists went too far. They argued that strikers were 
treated badly because they had no votes. They argued that the mayor would 
not have ignored their protests had these 20,000 women exercised political 
power. Women’s votes might have made a difference, but in this particular 
strike city officials mistreated strikers because of prejudice against poor, young, 
foreign girls. By contrast, they were very polite to women of wealth because of 
their individual power.97
 Strikers generally did not share the enthusiasm of the suffragists for the 
vote, for they observed that workingmen with votes failed to prevent strikes. 
Moreover, they “wanted something right away”: they could not count on the 
future. To working women, political equality was not likely to precede all other 
forms of equality. What was worse, as one of them said, “politics would only 
add to the burden.” 98
 Even thought the ballot did not seem to be a panacea for this strike, 
working women were not entirely opposed to it. Labor leaders saw the vote 
as a means of educating the rank and file. The ballot would expose working 
women to a wider range of society. A working woman should be educated so 
that she could improve her environment through politics.99
 While suffragists had an educational impact on the strikers, their wealth 
demoralized the independent spirit of some of the strikers. After risking arrest 
and a large bail by attacking a strikebreaker, Minnie Cohen innocently said, 
“Mrs. Belmont has enough money.”100 Socialists were especially afraid that 
the “Four Hundred （dollars）” would blind “those poor girls” to the working-
class consciousness. The Call repeatedly warned workers that they should not 
depend upon bosses or charity but should help themselves.101
 Most of the strikers appreciated wealthy supporters not only because of 
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their financial contributions but also because they treated with respect those 
working women who were used to being treated poorly. One of the strikers 
said that she would never forget “those good ladies” in her life because they 
treated her “nicely” and made her forget that she was a poor working woman. 
For her, “their friendship and sympathy are worth more than money.”102 On 
the other hand, there were some, mainly well-paid workers, who regarded the 
contribution of money as an attempt to equalize the disparity of wealth. They 
openly said that “we were disappointed because it was only a thousand dollars, 
and we had expected more from ladies of means.”103
 New Yorkers were not surprised at social extremes, but no ordinary 
person felt comfortable with the extravagance of the bourgeoisie. Strategies 
of wealthy suffragists for publicity were often so excessive and odd that some 
people were offended. One example was the suffragists’ “Fifth Avenue Parade” 
of “richly furnished” automobiles. Another was the “floral tribute”; when seven 
strikers were released form the workhouse, they were decorated with bronze 
medals as a token of martyrs who endured imprisonment for principle. “Mrs. 
Belmont’s tea party” for those “good” employers who signed the union con-
tract was another example. Such incidents all proved good copy for papers but 
not suitable tactics for common people.104 Indeed, many people argued that 
wealthy women found a “novel amusement” in which strikers were merely 
puppets and that they were using this opportunity to escape from their bore-
dom. Men in particular felt that wealthy women just wanted to demonstrate 
their power.105
 The World, impressed by the sympathy of wealthy women toward work-
ing sisters, questioned whether workingmen could expect the same treatment 
from “Fifth Avenue or Wall Street.”106 The newspaper’s tribute to the human-
ity of women, however, was misconceived because only a small minority of 
women actually helped the strike. Strikers were surprised at so many coins in 
the donation from prestigious women’s clubs.
 The reaction of Wall Street men to the strikers illustrated an entrenched 
feeling of class superiority and indifference to the plight of immigrant work-
ing women. The Call published a special issue, written by Vassar graduates in 
support of the strike, for the purpose of wider publicity and fund raising. They 
also hoped to show the public “how intelligent, well-dressed, and refined the 
strikers” were in order to counter strike opponents who thought of factory 
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women as “stupid, ignorant things.”107 Hundreds of strikers “invaded every 
part of the city,” and this unusual sight in the severe winter appealed to many 
New Yorkers’ hearts. They paid more than The Call’s price in order to express 
encouragement and sympathy. Forty-five thousand copies were sold, bringing 
strikers three thousand dollars within one and half days. While the majority 
of those who bought the special edition were workingmen and “sales ladies,” 
“the worst” group to strikers were people of Wall Street. One of the strikers 
was so angry that she could not speak to “a set of snobs” who failed to treat 
strikers as human beings. One of these businessmen mercilessly warned that 
strikers “would starve before the manufacturers would give in.” While women 
of the upper-class and the middle-class were sympathetic to working women, 
wealthy men were only a little better than the police.108
 This attitude did not always come from antagonism toward the work-
ing class. Rather, there was a strong sentiment about how women should 
behave. A group of wealthy women told strikers not to sell newspapers on 
the street. The New York Tribune remarked that strikers fought strikebreakers 
by “the most approved feminine tactics”---pulling hair and throwing rotten 
eggs or snowballs were common.109 The New York State Factory Investigating 
Commission asked Melinda Scott of the WTUL if women lost “a certain 
amount of their femininity” when they organized unions. Her answer was, of 
course, “No.”110
 The most serious problem of wealthy sympathizers was that they were 
uninterested in the labor cause itself. What troubled large manufacturers 
were the grievances strikers articulated most bitterly: bad working conditions. 
Employers were confident that such conditions did not exist. Mr. Leiserson, 
against whom Lemlich protested, announced that he would give five thousand 
dollars to any charity if what strikers described could be proven. In spite of re-
peated requests by manufacturers to investigate factories, none of the wealthy 
women responded. It is possible that they feared to disclose relatively good 
conditions in the large factories after gaining so much public support through 
the “better working condition” propaganda. In any case, it seemed to the pub-
lic that wealthy supporters manipulated strikers for their own interests.111 
 The strike served to educate the upper-class women, helping to correct 
some of their misconceptions about factory women. Many wealthy women 
had assumed that the factory was a stop on the road to prostitution and that 
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factory women “ought to look tired-out.” Agnes Nestor, a glove maker and 
later a member of Chicago WTUL, was amused when her best clothes at a 
woman’s club meeting did not comply with the stereotype of what her audi-
ence expected. “You are not real working girl! Look at the good blouse you are 
wearing!,” exclaimed a clubwoman.112
 Knowing each other closely, however, does not necessarily lead to bet-
ter understanding. The more working women became acquainted with “the 
society women,” the more they realized how wide the gulf between them 
was. It was too wide to be narrowed with money and sympathy. The name of 
“sisterhood” concealed a fragile relationship between the two extremes of un-
equal power. Working women saw their allies as the “fortunate,” while allies 
saw working women as the “helpless” Pity inevitably accompanied the allies’ 
feeling of superiority. The Evening Journal reported that Anne Morgan was 
determined to work for strikers “with her social standing and her father’s tre-
mendous wealth.” Rose Stokes, socialist of wealth, announced that she would 
use “every influence in her power” on behalf of shirtwaist sisters.113
 But there was a limit to cooperation between women of the working-
class and their wealthy sympathizers. Many people keenly felt that the be-
nevolent intervention of non-working women could not change the industrial 
situation. When Belmont tried to extend this strike to all working women in 
New York, female schoolteachers refused it on the ground that they did “not 
believe a sympathetic strike of this kind would gain anything.”114
 Finally, a careful reader of the press would not believe that women were 
united for a common cause. The conflict between suffragettes and social-
ists was obvious. Socialists denounced the support of wealthy people as false 
friendship on the ground that women of the capitalist class could never un-
derstand working women.115 For many female socialists, the strike was a test 
of their ability to help working women as well as a good chance to recruit new 
members. Although the International Workingmen’s Association launched 
the socialist movement in New York as early as the 1860s, progress had been 
slow. In spite of many opportunities in which they could have taken an ac-
tive role, socialists failed to serve the working-class because they were not 
well-organized.116
  Socialists were not opposed to the vote for women. They accepted the 
necessity of women’s political liberation. Stokes advised working women not 
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to let the strike victory be their ultimate goal. She told them that they “should 
identify themselves with the women of suffrage movement.”117 Yet, social-
ists thought that the ballot could do little good unless people used it to free 
themselves industrially. Stokes also criticized workingmen for supporting their 
employers politically while fighting against them industrially.
 As socialists became overshadowed by the suffragettes, however, they 
started criticizing suffragists and capitalists together. Instead of arguing over 
the issue of how to help strikers, suffragists and socialists seemed to fight over 
which would get working women on their side. Malkiel wrote in The Call: 
“Comrades, every moment has its opportunities; this is ours. These new re-
cruits are still open to conviction.”118 Socialists were positive that suffragists 
were expecting to recruit working women by using the socialists. Within a 
month of the general strike, the New York Times interpreted the strike as an 
open battle between these two interests, with the voice of fighting strikers 
diminished.119
7. Conclusion
 History makes us wonder if some of us are here only to suffer for the 
benefit of future generations. Courageous shirtwaist strikers of the Triangle 
had little reason to believe that some of them were to be burned to death 
only one year later without having benefited from their exertions. Triangle 
Shirtwaist Factory has been best remembered for its fire because of its heavy 
casualties and resultant workplace safety. But we should also keep in mind that 
Triangle workers had already planted the seeds of reform when they initiated 
the strike by exposing corruption between business and politics, which forced 
many New Yorkers to realize a dire need for structural changes in American 
democracy.120 
 When the shirtwaist workers rose up, New Yorkers were not unaware 
of the hardship of immigrants in industry, for they were accustomed to seeing 
immigrants used “as an excuse to permit the dehumanizing of our cities,” as in 
the words of Alice Henry, a member of the WTUL.121 When the strikers un-
expectedly encountered injustice of the municipality, however, New Yorkers re-
alized that the problem was not limited to the immigrant. Rather, a number of 
people began to understand that the problem of the immigrant was a different 
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face of a larger social problem and that “the betterment of one element is for 
the ultimate political advancement of all,” reported The World.122
 If the strikers provided New Yorkers with a strong stimulus for a new 
social consciousness, Henry was right that “every race that has settled down 
here in this America has some special contribution to bestow.” As the strike 
proved, however, the cooperation of native-born Americans was vital in the 
process of social betterment. Public sympathy with the strikers made responsi-
ble manufacturers feel obliged to treat their workers better.
 As Tarbell pointed out, what is remarkable about the “Uprising of 
Twenty-thousand” is that New Yorkers recognized that “it is a movement 
which must be respected.” She was impressed by “a new and growing sense of 
the solidarity of society that if anybody was making a fight against a wrong, it 
was their business to stand by and help.”123 Both immigrant working women 
and wealthy American women found a sense of comradeship with a group 
that they had previously considered the “other half.” Together they succeeded 
in creating an atmosphere in which more people would pay attention to the 
condition of women as a whole. These young immigrant workers also discov-
ered that they had power to fight for their ideals and to make a difference. 
Even though their life styles would never match, both immigrants and wealthy 
women of New York saw their potential to better their society by acting on 
together and remaining true to their own ideas.124
 As a labor movement, it was the first great strike of women. As reported 
by the U.S. Congress, while historically “strikes by women alone [had been] 
infrequent,” the shirtwaist strike initiated by a single shop, the Triangle, came 
to influence shirtwaist makers outside of New York, such as Philadelphia, 
and other trades. Congress discovered that women were willing to sacrifice 
themselves with “others for a common cause” and that they were often more 
persistent than men.125 In retrospect, it sounds an exaggeration, but to the 
contemporaries, the general strike of the shirtwaist workers “marked the first 
stage of a revolution,” for it provided a solid foundation for unionism in the 
industry.126
 When foreign-born shirtwaist working women began to feel close to 
New Yorkers, the Triangle fire entirely severed their ties. It was not until this 
tragic fire that people learned the importance of protective laws; collective bar-
gaining was not enough.127 Great changes were made, but those who lost their 
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lives in the fire were not to be the ones to reap the benefits.128 Those of us who 
have benefited from their sacrifice had better listen to the newcomers because 
their voices are likely to make our society more democratic for all. 
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